Kwara State Association of Nigeria, North America (KSANG.ORG)

Friday, July 24, 2009              

FOLLOWING their joint investigation into the implementation of the 2009 Appropriation Act, the House of Representatives' Committees on Appropriation and Finance found that "the Federal Government's actual revenue (expendable fund) was N27.98 billion higher than the budgeted figures during the first four months of the year 2009". Although the Presidency had indicated last May that there was a 30 per cent shortfall in the budgeted revenue in the first quarter, funds were obtained from both revenue sources not captured in the Appropriation Act and the Excess Crude oil account to cushion the projected revenue gap for the year. Nonetheless, the House observed that the President had not followed due process as the right thing to do was for Mr. President to seek the prior approval of the National Assembly (NASS) before endorsing any withdrawal from the Excess Crude Oil account. We agree and urge the President to always abide by the rules.

Given the ostensible excess revenue above, the House rejected any claim that inadequate funding posed any constraint and insisted that the president should implement the budget fully or risk possible impeachment. It will be recalled that, apart from inadequate funding, the point was made that most of the constituency projects which the legislators inserted in the budget without any consultation with the executive arm that would be required to supervise their execution, lacked proper design and costing and were therefore unimplementable.

The report of the joint committees to the House was conveniently silent on the stated make-or-mar requirements for projects to be included in the budget . In the circumstance, we share the position of the executive and hold that such constituency projects have no place in the 2009 budget. Hence, instead of dissipating energy on unnecessary confrontation by embarking on impeachment proceedings against the President, the legislators should accept the home truth that they cannot rig the budget, for self-enrichment as was the intention under the 2009 budget. Therefore, legislators will do well to begin early consultations for an acrimony-free 2010 budget.

We, however, laud the legislators for the present resolve to rev up their oversight activities and put an end to the high levels of the budget under-implementation which the executive arm has exhibited in the last 10 years of democracy. The presidency is expected to implement any well-prepared budget to the highest degree possible. But the National Assembly has to do a thorough job in its laudable mission. For instance, although the House accused the executive arm of selectively implementing the 2009 budget, it is not clear what proportion of the mutually approved projects has been implemented. Every odd Wednesday, the Federal Executive Council announces the award of one contract or another, but that forms only a part of the project execution.

Seven months into the 2009 fiscal year, the news was that some legislators during the consideration of the joint committee's report attributed the current rash of industrial action to the executive arm's failure to implement relevant aspects of the budget. Maybe, with the unimplementable constituency projects out of the way, it is long overdue for the president to submit the promised supplementary budget that will restore the initial projects whose provisions were either slashed or removed outright to accommodate the ill-conceived pet projects of legislators. Going forward, the National Assembly should not only satisfy itself that all mutually approved projects are being physically and verifiably executed as scheduled but also keep the public abreast of achieved levels of implementation in each case at regular intervals.

Now, in the current search for enhanced budget implementation, a number of legislators have wondered why capital votes were usually returned unspent at the end of the year while the unspent overhead component vanished into thin air. For selfish reasons, legislators tend to equate release of funds to full budget implementation. But it is quite obvious from experience that the release of budgeted funds as it currently plays out actually detracts from faithful implementation of the budget. In order to ensure improved budget implementation, therefore, accrued revenue for specific projects should be left in the perfect safety of the federal treasury from where it could be released strictly in direct settlement of client firms or individuals as and when the projects are duly executed or other commitments mature.

What the National Assembly needs to do is to quickly enact legislation barring the premature release of budgeted funds to the MDAs ahead of project execution because the practice, apart from posing problems to monetary policy management, turns MDAs into middlemen that would rather trade with the funds at their disposal to further base interests than faithfully facilitate early and sound execution of the projects for which the funds were earmarked.

Again, in their new-found zeal to ensure that the budget is implemented as passed (we repeat the proviso that the budget be well prepared), the legislators, unfortunately, failed to recognise the mother counter-budget practice that has stunted the national economy for over three decades. All budgets as passed constrain government to expend realised (actual) naira revenue domestically plus a safe and duly specified dose of deficit. Over the last decade of democracy, for instance, the level of implementation of the capital budget in any given year was below 50 per cent officially. Government trumpeted the savings which took the form of unreleased and returned unspent funds. Thus the decade witnessed seemingly unbroken budget surpluses, which would ordinarily foster relatively conducive economic environment.

On the other hand, the prevailing reality of intractable excess liquidity, high inflation, deteriorating naira exchange rate, inhospitable production environment, prohibitive lending rates, comatose real sector and massive unemployment, in the cause-and effect realm of economics, are incontrovertible evidence of excessive government deficit spending.

Since the non-oil receipts are undisputed actual revenue whose expenditure is non-inflationary, we are left to conclude that the naira equivalents that are substituted for Federation Account dollar proceeds for sharing among the three tiers of government and which make the bulk of what the joint committee earlier termed "the Federal Government's actual revenue (expendable fund)" do not meet the test of realised revenue qua revenue.

Consequently the crusade for the executive arm to implement well-prepared budgets as passed in order to achieve high levels of budget execution must begin by getting the executive arm to go through the universal banks in order to convert and properly monetise Federation Account dollar allocations to the three tiers of government into actual naira revenue for government expenditure.

Friday, July 24, 2009              

By Reuben Abati

IS the Niger Delta conflict being ethnicised? Does it face the risk of being reduced to an Ijaw/Yoruba face-off? Or perhaps at some stage the Niger Delta/Igbo/Yoruba/Hausa-Fulani face-off? Of what import is the introduction of ethnic and territorial factors into the Niger Delta struggle within the larger Nigerian question? The earliest attempt to introduce an ethnic angle to the Niger Delta discourse in more recent times, would seem to be the splitting of hair between certain Northern establishment intellectuals who argued that the crude oil in the Niger Delta actually belongs to Northerners and that what Niger Deltans are fighting over is Northern property which escaped towards the Delta through some geomorphism over the centuries. Southern intellectuals have debunked this with equal vehemence. There can be no doubt about the Niger Delta people's claim to the ownership of the extractive resources in their region. But a frightening clash of ethnic emotions has resurfaced in the Niger Delta conversation since the Sunday July 12 attack on the Atlas Cove Jetty in Lagos by the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

The Lagos State Government was the first to condemn the turning of its territory into a battle field, with a subtle threat that this "must not repeat itself". The state government has since been joined by the Yoruba establishment, expressing its objections, through meetings in various Yoruba "creeks", and the threat of war drums. The Yoruba Council of Elders is asking for a meeting with President Yar'çdua to discuss the development. The Oodua Peoples Congress, the Coalition of Oodua Self-Determination Groups (COSEG), and the Committee of Indigenous Associations of Lagos State have each promised retaliatory action in the event of a recurrence. On July 20, a meeting of Concerned Yoruba Leaders and Elders was held at the Airport Hotel in Lagos, comprising party leaders, traditional rulers, and all the Chairmen of the 57 local councils in Lagos. A report in The Nation newspaper titled "Lagos elders to militants: don't try another attack" pointed out that "it was an emotionally charged meeting" (The Nation, July 21, p.1)

This "quasi-war council" issued the following threat: "We hereby give a serious warning to the militants in the Niger Delta to view the latest attack as the last of such, and that the incident must never again be repeated as any attempt to do so would be met with serious consequences which the attackers would live to regret". The Yoruba groups demanded an apology, and as if to demonstrate the possible consequences, some Ijaw fishermen in Badagry were attacked by angry Yoruba youths. What has been the response from Niger Delta militants? An Ijaw group, namely the Ijaw Media Forum issued a statement apologising to the Lagos State Government for the attack on the Atlas Cove jetty.

But MEND, the protagonist of the incident has since dismissed the ethnic and territorial objections of the Yoruba elements on three grounds (1) that the Atlas Cove jetty is Federal Government property and hence Lagos State was not the target of the attack, (2) that there will be no hiding place for oil companies anywhere in Nigeria and (3) Jomo Gbomo speaking on behalf of MEND claims that both OPC and the YCE are ranting. If anything he insists, it is the Yoruba that should be apologising to the Niger Delta "after their son, Olusegun Obasanjo wiped out Odi with innocent civilians and stole our commonwealth as the Minister of Petroleum. ...The Niger Delta issue may have started in the Niger Delta, but the problem caused by injustice knows no boundaries. It is a Nigerian problem that should be enjoyed or suffered by all....It seems some people just enjoy ranting. Is the OPC threatening to attack any Niger Deltan or a particular state or tribe there? We have the Itsekiris, Isokos, Urhobos, Ijaws, Ibibios, Igbos, Efiks, so who do they plan on attacking first? Do they plan on attacking pipelines and oil companies and making our job easier or plan to destroy non-existent infrastructure? ..." (Daily Sun, July 22, p. 6).

Jomo Gbomo's rhetoric is logical in relation to MEND's objectives, but he surely does not speak for all Niger Deltans. There is no doubt that Nigeria is paying for the mistake of taking the Niger Delta militants for granted, treating them when the rebellion began as if it would fizzzle out with time; what the Atlas Cove incident has demonstrated is the failure of Nigerian leadership and the vulnerability of the Nigerian state, what we are dealing with is a Nigerian problem. From the point of view of strategy, it was a huge triumph for Niger Delta militants, and MEND may not have intended the attack on the Atlas Cove Jetty to be an attack on Yoruba interest.

But the ethnicisation of the incident is crowding out the opportunities for learning a few lessons which it graphically presents: there are lessons here for the Federal Government, the Lagos state government and the Niger Delta struggle. Nigeria is in deep trouble, Atlas Cove points to a national security crisis of grave dimensions. The current "Hurricane Moses" hits directly at the soft underbelly of the Nigerian state and should be seen as a signal that something more than amnesty offer and symbolic palliatives is required in addressing the crisis. The militants as seen in Jomo Gbomo's statement, do not seem to be intimidated by the protests by the Yoruba groups nor do they seem to care. But there is need for caution on all sides. With emerging talks about "our territory"and "their son", and plans by the YCE to hold a meeting with Yar'Adua, the objectives of the struggle and the relevance for all progressive groups could be diluted.

One gain of recent developments is however as follows: in many quarters, there had been an attempt by Nigerians in comfort zones to treat the Niger Delta issue as an external crisis, and the devastation and uncertainties in the region as "their problem". Bringing the conflict to the shores of Lagos has suddenly put the Niger Delta at the top of the public agenda, it has moved it immediately to the level of "our problem". It is a rude awakening. It has provided a rallying point for the expression of fears about territory and security, and although concerned Yoruba Leaders and Elders have issued threats, they have been forced nonetheless to take on the Niger Delta issue as a matter of direct importance to the security of their own people. They want to talk to Yar'çdua. Traditional rulers had to abandon their palaces to discuss the Niger Delta struggle, local government chairman left the treasury alone for a while to discuss the coming of MEND to Lagos!. The seeming ethnicisation of the Niger Delta conversation is a development that should be taken seriously nonetheless by both the militants and the rest of Nigeria, for it is a danger signal.

There are among other things, four touchy subjects in the Nigerian arrangement whose mismanagement could result in a national emergency: one- oil - the major source of the country's revenue two: personal security: three- ethnicity/territory - this is a ready source of conflict in Nigeria which activates primordial instincts for survival, and four: religion. MEND has shown its readiness to force the issue on all of these fronts, if need be. It has touched on three already; the introduction of a religious dimension is imaginable, but MEND should also be careful not to lose the momentum that it has gained by adopting strategies that could defeat its core philosophical objectives. The special challenge that the Nigerian government faces is this: it must begin to approach the Niger Delta crisis and the implications for Nigeria's wholesomeness with a higher level of rigour and urgency than is currently being demonstrated. It needs not wait for the country to be up in flames before it embarks on more meaningful dialogue and action on the Niger Delta Question. For the Federal Government, the Navy and the Lagos State Government, there are security issues along the coastline that would still have to be addressed.

Will MEND's extra-territorial aggression alienate other Nigerians? Yes, possibly. It is a double-edged sword, not without costs. With recent attempts by the Federal Government to seek the partnership of the militant groups in the Niger Delta, MEND and similar groups should explore the offered opportunties for dialogue. What the people of the Niger Delta want invariably is exactly what most other Nigerian ethnic nationalities want: justice, equity and fiscal federalism. At the Airport Hotel meeting, for example, the Yoruba equally expressed frustration with their circumstances, detailing spefically how Lagos State has been abandoned and marginalised by the Federal authorities. Nearly all the country's over 400 ethnic nationalities have one complaint or the other. Niger Delta strategists need the partnership of other ethnic nationalities and progressive forces in their search for change. Violent incursions which drive up ethnic sentiments and which make Niger Deltans an unfair target of reprisal attacks could dilute the revolutionary import of the struggle in the same manner as kidnapping and other criminal activities in the Niger Delta.

The Nigerian leadership elite appears confused in addressing the crisis truthfully, in part because the present contentious status quo provides opportunities for a corrupt and unwise minority that is interested only in its own economic security and the power it wields. The partnership of other nationalities would be required in driving the momentum for change at policy and constitutional levels. What cannot be denied however is the fact that the Atlas Cove incident has woken us all up to the reality that there can be no comfort zones for as long as there is injustice or internal colonialism in any part of Nigeria.

The Niger Delta crisis is not hundreds of miles away, it is in our backyards, it is the pimple on our face, sitting delicately on a dangerous vein; it is the keg of gunpowder on which Nigeria sits. All concerned elders, leaders, politicians, be they in Lagos, Aba, Kafanchan, Kano, Aso Villa or Maiduguri can be mobilised through constructive engagement, and dialogue to focus more on the struggle for a better Nigeria. Engaging in ethnically-determined rhetoric which reduces the subject to the level of primordial sentiments and biases serves only the divide and rule objective of the ruling class.